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ABSTRACT 
This article explores the topicality of Porter’s generic strategies, 
assessing about their applicability on two specific automotive industry 
projects: The Smart and the New Beetle.   
After performing a documentation analysis on these two projects, it 
was concluded that both of them may be considered avoidable 
strategic mistakes as they show the risks of higher differentiation that 
is not being paid by the customer, no matter how if it is about 
recognized brands or icon products. Hazards and risks, like big 
losses and negative margins, are applicable to every firm.    
This is a qualitative investigation with a not experimental and 
transversal research design.  
Keywords: Strategy; Generic; Mistake; Competitiveness; Value; 
Smart; New Beetle; Michel Porter’s generic strategies;  Competitive 
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
 Competitive Advantage (CA), strategy and Operational Effectiveness (OE) 
have been an academic and empirical discussion for years. Professor Michael Porter 
proposed fundamental management theories on these subjects and, during a long 
period, critics have been posed on his work. Mekic and Mekic (2014) suggest that: 
• In accordance with Speed (1989), the Five Competitive Forces are arbitrary 
and there is not shown how to operationalize any analysis based on these 
forces.  
• CA is best practices for a company (WELCH, 2005), but also CA can derive 
from external or internal forces like resources and environment, basis for CA, 
too (BARNEY, 1991). 
• Operational Effectiveness (OE) refers to doing the same things in better ways 
than others do, not to strategy (BACHMANN, 2002). Strategy relates to 
combining activities; that is why managers may lose the whole picture of the 
company thinking on core competencies, critical resources and key success 
factors (KIPPENBERGER, 1997).  
• Generic strategies (cost leadership, differentiation and focus) seem to be a 
parameter of choice for every firm; however, this choice is bounded by the 
size of the firm, industry and competitive analysis, and access to resources. 
As a result, small companies should only compete through focus strategy 
whereas bigger firms may choose cost leadership and differentiation 
(WRIGHT, 1987).  
 In addition, Dawes (1996) suggests that the generic strategy schema do not fit 
 with  what  happens in reality and that they are not a route to superior 
 profitability. Datta (2009) argues that cost leadership theory rests well with a 
 heavy initial investment in state-of-the-art equipment, which is impossible for 
 small firms when they are not clear about its CA. The author insists that cost 
 leadership needs a high market  share, which is unachievable at the 
beginning  of a business. 
• Although not relying solely on Porter’s work, it should be considered because 
it could be the basis when deciding on strategy and CA (RECKLIES, 2011). 
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 Moreover, that strategy, OE and generic strategies are relevant factors to 
understand and prevent from strategic mistakes that derive into losses and 
negative margins in every firm.  
1.1. Objective of this investigation 
 To explore the topicality of Porter’s generic strategies, assessing about their 
applicability on two specific automotive projects: the Smart and the New Beetle, 
proposing actions to improve strategic decisions and implementations.  
1.2. Design: Methodology and analysis 
 This is a qualitative study, which explores and describes information of 
relevant authors and specialists gathered in the period Jul. 2016 - Nov. 2016. 
 The investigation design is not experimental and, among them, transversal as 
it is referred at a precise moment in time.  
 The analysis unit included the study of strategy, OE and generic strategies. 
Important secondary sources were used to complete this review.  
 This study was performed in Buenos Aires, Argentina. 
1.3. Research limitations/clarifications 
 The information included in this analysis is the one that was judged to be 
needed in order to support -in a reasonable way- the basis of this investigation. 
 As this study is based on bibliographical review, it was not used an empirical 
analysis. 
 Conclusions are based on what is exposed in this study and -as a qualitative 
research-results shown cannot be generalized; however, they may be useful for 
management decisions.  
1.4. Findings  
 A deeper understanding on strategy, CA, OE and generic strategies should be 
put in place in every organization, no matter its size and location. The specific 
organization and skills needed are directly connected with a proper implementation 
of that understanding.  
 There were taken two projects as examples: the Smart and the New Beetle, 
which are shown as avoidable strategic mistakes due to a higher differentiation that 
was applied to these products and it, finally, was not paid by the customer. 
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 Recognized brand or icon products do not guarantee success in the business arena; 
big losses and negative margins are applicable to every company.  
 Leadership is about strategy and management is about OE. In order to have 
sustainable growth, the leader’s job refers to:  
• Focus on their present and future industries and select the right one/s to 
compete. 
• Establish an adequate set of distinctive activities. 
• Develop the next practices needed to go forward.  
• Be open and flexible, and look for nonconformity, uncharted territories, 
development through learning, helping others, inclusion, transparency, and 
loyalty.  
1.5. Originality and value 
 As, success stories abound in business literature, it is hard to find mistakes 
because they are not easily recognized and sometimes hidden. However, it is 
demonstrated that admitting a mistake is better when somebody wants to learn.   
 As a result, this study may help executives and entrepreneurs when taking 
important strategic decisions in their companies.   
 
2. THE IMPORTANCE OF STRATEGY AND OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE (OE) 
 Strategy, organization and performance are key issues while considering 
company results. White (1986) states that: 
• It is needed a fit between the internal organization and the strategy of a firm. 
An inappropriate internal organization may cause to perform less than full 
potential. 
• There is a distinction between corporate strategy (where to compete, in which 
industries and geographic areas) and business strategy (how to compete 
within a given industry). Nevertheless, at business or corporate levels, the 
strategy-organization-performance problematic exists. 
• In multi-business companies, business unit strategy can be influenced by key 
personnel choice, and by the internal and external business unit organization. 
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 • Cost strategies efforts are directed to reducing costs. That´s the reason why, 
they are connected to concepts like higher ROI while giving lower autonomy 
and higher responsibilities sharing.  
• Differentiation efforts are directed to creating perceived uniqueness amongst 
customers. In this case, strategy requires of strong functional coordination 
unified under the business unit manager.  
 In addition, Porter (1996) states that: 
• Flexibility, outsourcing, benchmarking/best practices and positioning are not 
differentiators anymore. Copying others is a path to “mutually destructive 
competition” and to temporary CA.  
• Sustainable profitability is almost impossible, as there is confusion between 
operational effectiveness and strategy. Tools and techniques like change 
management, outsourcing, total quality management and the like are helping 
operational improvements, but not sustainable profitability. 
• Superior performance needs from Operational Effectiveness (OE) and 
strategy, but they work differently. Outperforming rivals implies to charge 
greater prices and to have greater efficiencies through lowering unit average 
costs. As there are many activities required to carry out the different tasks 
that are needed in a company (sell, produce, create products, and distribute, 
for example), costs advantages come from being more efficient than 
competitors are and differentiation arises from the choice of activities and 
how they are performed. As a result, “activities are the basic units of 
competitive advantage”.  OE is doing better than rivals, it is about inputs and 
outputs, and efficiency is its key word; it is about moving the productivity 
frontier (new ways of managing, capital investment or new personnel). On the 
contrary, strategic positioning means doing different activities than rivals or in 
different ways. 
• Constant improvement on OE is necessary but not enough when considering 
extended period; best practices imitation is its worst enemy as generic 
solutions diffuse the fastest and managers let OE supplant strategy. The 
result is a pressure on costs and prices, compromising long term 
sustainability. In other terms, homogeneity and imitation are the basis of 
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 diminishing returns for incumbents, and managers are supplanting strategy 
by OE, which is the basis of performance. 
• On the other hand, competitive strategy is about being different, choosing a 
different set of activities than competitors. In this way, the essence of strategy 
is in the activities that are chosen. As a result, strategy is “the creation of a 
unique and valuable position, involving a different set of activities” (p. 68) to 
be chosen, and it is needed a trade-off among them. Activities cannot be 
separated from the whole and position comes from positions built on systems 
of activities. That is why, trade-offs are the essence of strategy and imply 
choosing what not to do.  
• While OE is about achieving excellence in individual activities, strategy is 
connected with combining those activities. Organizational structure, 
processes and systems must be strategy-specific as strategy is seen as an 
activity system. As a consequence, cost-cutting and restructuring are not 
strategies, are distractions to growth.  
• Leadership is not about orchestrating operational improvements and making 
deals. The core of a general management position is strategy; it is about 
defining a unique position, making trade-offs and fit among activities; it is 
about deciding what to do and what not to do.  
• OE improvement is part of management job, but it is not strategy. It is 
connected with best practices and continual improvement.  
• Finally, OE and strategy are part of two different agendas.   
 Out from what it was said, to turn firms into leaders is more than 
benchmarking other companies. Prahalad (2010) is convinced that benchmarking 
has a role in leadership catching up with competitors but it does not turn companies 
into leaders. It is needed to spot big opportunities and next practices in order to 
become winners.  
 He understands that next practices (not best practices) are about imagining 
the future as Apple’s Steve Jobs and Tata Motors’s Ratan Tata do/did. So, to identify 
the big opportunities that may arise he proposes questions, as:  
• Is the problem widely recognized and affects other industries? 
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 • Does it need radical innovations and can change the industry economics? 
• Tackling this issue, will give a fresh competitive advantage and will create a 
big opportunity? 
 He proposes that inclusive development is an example as smart companies 
had come up with low priced products as a $ 2,000 car, a $ 100 laptop, a $ 30 
cataract surgery procedure and $ 0,002 cell phone call per minute. In fact, for 2015 
he predicted that 5 billion people all over the world would be using cell phones. 
Consequently, giants like Unilever and P&G think that -for 2020- 50% of their 
worldwide revenues will come from poor people in the developing world. 
 Additionally, due to the connection between inclusive development and 
sustainability, (more than 4 billion micro consumers and micro producers will place 
an unsustainable stress on the earth in the future), sustainability is another big 
challenge.  
 Prahalad (2010) cites that Drucker once said that opportunities are “visible, 
but not seen”. That is why inclusive development is seen as a Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) not as a path to growth. He ends up saying that sustainability is 
not a problem but an opportunity to innovate. Imagination is the principal constraint 
to discovering mega-.opportunities, not resources.  
 Likewise, Prahalad (2010) remarks important characteristics of managerial 
responsibilities, as follows: 
- Nonconformity and the value to entering into uncharted territories.  
- Displaying a commitment to learning and developing yourself in order to help 
others.  
- Help others displaying their full potential investing on them.  
- Good leaders are inclusive, so relate with the unfortunate.  
- Develop fair and transparent processes and take a look at how results are 
achieved. You will be judged by what you do and how well you do it, not for 
what you said you wanted to do. 
- Remark loyalty to the organization, profession, community, society and family, 
as anything can be achieved without family’s support.  
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 - Leadership is about self-awareness, modesty, humility and humanity it is 
requested to be aware of the poor and disabled, accepting human 
weaknesses. 
 Big opportunities are about to come and leaders must set the right strategy 
and organization to transform them into sustainable and inclusive growth. OE is a 
need, but not all what is needed. To select the right industry to compete, the right set 
of activity system and the right next practices are a must. Openness and flexibility 
are an imperative for growth. 
 In the following Table 1 it is shown a summary of what it was said in this 
section:  
Table 1:    Strategy and Operational Excellence 
• Full potential of a firm comes from a proper fit between the internal organization and the
strategy.
• It must be distinguished between corporate strategy and business strategy.
• Cost strategies are related to costs reductions, ROI and efficiencies. Differentiation strategies
to build a perceived uniqueness among customers.
• Strategy is a path to sustainable profitability, not OE. It is about doing different activities or in
different ways.
• OE is about inputs and outputs, and doing better than competitors. It is needed for superior
performance.
• Activities are the basis for competitive advantage. And differentiation arises from choosing
them and how they are performed.
• Leadership is about strategy, spotting new opportunities and next practices. Its key concepts
are: defining a unique position, making trade-offs and fit among activities, and decide what to
do and what not to do.
• Management is about OE.
• Inclusive development should be seen as a path to growth, not as a CSR. As big firms are
predicting for next years huge percentages of revenues coming from poor people, it should be
seen as a big opportunity example to chase.
• Key words for business people: nonconformity, uncharted territories, learning, development,
help others, inclusion, fairness, transparency, loyalty, new leadership.
 
 
 
3. UNDERSTANDING GENERIC STRATEGIES 
 It is hard to win playing the same game others do. That is why the competitive 
arena is about playing a different game that the leader plays as the leader is who 
designed the rules and have the resources to defend them.  
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  Throughout history, in different markets and industrial sectors, there were 
companies that changed the rules and have control in their industries, others who 
influence and others that neither one nor the other. The difference among them is to 
have a clear strategy and to change the rules of the game0F1.  
 Moreover, to think about competitive strategy is to work on what the company 
should seem in the future, and to think that operational strategy is emphasize 
operational efficiency and effectiveness. Both are needed, but OE is not enough to 
sustainable growth as it was said before.     
 In this sense, Porter (2008) proposes three generic strategies:  
• Cost leadership (no frills): it relates to gaining CA through lowest costs of 
production, removing costs from every link of the value chain. The product 
can be priced at a competitive parity and profit per product is lower if it is 
compared with differentiation generic strategy. That is the reason why it 
requires high market share in order to achieve revenue targets.  
Key concepts under this strategy are: scale (big volume and efficient capacity 
utilization), cost reduction/minimization, integration, quick learning and control. 
There is a point in which it must be done a differentiation sacrifice and no 
more features must be added to the product/service.  
The risks that may be faced are: being trapped on high investments, to ignore 
differentiation basis and/or to be exposed a cost reductions that are 
implementable by other competitors. As an example, General Motors and 
Wal-Mart are firms that target price-sensible customers. 
 To be successful with this generic strategy it is needed to have access to 
 technologies that will bring costs down, to be very efficient in logistic and/or 
 consistently be in the position to cut costs below those of other competitors.   
• Differentiation (creating uniquely desirable products and services): it 
relates to the creation of differentiated/more attractive products for different 
segments, charging customers with premium prices. Profit per product is 
                                                 
1 In this sense, Harvard Professor Clayton Christensen developed the disruptive innovation 
theory which states that new entrants may put out of play industry’s incumbents. But this subject is not 
going to be analyzed as it exceeds the scope of this investigation. For more information, see 
Christensen’s book: The Innovator’s Dilemma (1997), Harvard Business School Publishing, USA: 
Boston. 
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 higher in comparison to cost leadership generic strategy, but market share is 
smaller. This generic strategy includes quality and certainly is costly. How to 
do this depends on industry characteristics but it may include: features, 
durability, functionality, brand image, support, and the like.  
Key concepts under this strategy are: to be unique, brand loyalty, less price 
sensibility and exclusivity.  
Its risks imply high cost of differentiation, no need for differentiation and 
imitative products.  Examples: Mercedes Benz, Audi or BMW. 
To be successful with this generic strategy implies to nurture R&D, innovation, 
ability to deliver high-quality products/services, and to build an effective sales 
and marketing to make the market understand the benefits offered.   
• Focus or niche segment (offering a specialized service in a niche 
market): it is related to focusing on a narrow and defined market segment. It 
means that it will be developed a uniquely low cost or well-specified 
product/service, generally with a strong brand loyalty among their customers. 
After deciding a focus strategy, it is requested to decide if it is going to be 
pursued cost leadership or differentiation, as focus in not normally enough on 
its own. It is necessary to offer something extra in the selected niche. Porsche 
is a case: their customers appreciate the CA created especially for that niche.  
 Risks are connected with situations like the niche may not grow or disappear.   
As it was mentioned above and considering that focus or niche segment 
generic strategy is finally a differentiation or cost strategy for a specific 
segment, for the purpose of this study it will be generalized that there are two 
generic strategies: cost leadership and differentiation. 
 
 In addition, Porter (2008) suggests that: 
• It is not convenient to be positioned in the middle of these generic strategies 
as the company: a) doesn’t achieve any generic strategy, having difficulties to 
generate profits, and b) there is uncertainty and lack of clarity. A clear 
example is the automotive company Fiat/Chrysler; historically, both firms had 
problems delivering positive results. 
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 • It is not possible to choose both strategies at a time as cost leaderships needs 
an internal focus on processes and differentiation an outward highly creative 
approach. In order to choose wisely a generic strategy it is essential to 
consider organization’s competencies, strengths and weaknesses, as per the 
following steps: 
1- SWOT analysis, to understand where success and risks are.  
2- Five competitive forces analysis, to know the nature of the industry you 
are in. 
3- Compare 1 and 2, and ask yourself if it could be reduced  or managed 
the supplier and customer power, and the threat of substitution or new 
entry, and finally if it could be built an uncontested place in the market. 
4- Generic strategy selection will give you the best and strongest set of 
options. 
 It is essential to take into consideration that, when selecting a generic 
strategy, it will be very difficult to change it in the near future as it implies a whole 
organizational context to be developed (abilities and skills, among others). 
 Complementing what Porter says, Dess and Davis (1984) demonstrates the 
“viability and usefulness of categorizing firms within an industry into strategic groups 
on the basis of their intended strategies” or Porter’s generic strategies. They suggest 
that: 
• Strategies differ among firms and better strategies make a difference in 
performance results.  
• There are groups of firms in the same industry with similar strategies, like 
home appliances, chemical process and consumer goods which differ along 
dimensions rather than size and market share.  
• Each generic strategy represents a group of strategy groups in which a firm 
may want to compete in. To be “stuck in the middle” implies low profitability as 
the firm will not take advantage of any generic strategy. As a consequence, 
these three groups (two, as per our purpose) serve to explain profitability and 
performance of firms within an industry.  
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  Finally, Porter indicates that each generic strategy is connected with different 
organizational skills, and strategy influences any industrial sector.  
 The following Table 2 shows the basic elements of generic strategies 
suggested before: 
Table 2: Generic strategies 
 Cost Leadership Differentiation 
It is about Lower production costs–No frills. Making differentiation sacrifices. 
Differentiated/more attractive 
products creation. 
Includes quality and is costly. 
Price Competitive parity Premium 
Profit per product Less Higher 
Market share High Small 
Key concepts 
Scale. 
Cost reduction/minimization. 
Integration. 
Quick learning. 
Control. 
To be unique. 
Brand loyalty. 
Less price sensibility. 
Exclusivity. 
 
Risks 
High investments. 
Ignore differentiation basis. 
Imitable cost reductions. 
High cost of differentiation. 
No need for differentiation. 
Imitative products. 
Company emphasis / 
skills and abilities Efficiency and effectiveness R&D and innovation. 
Examples General Motors / Wal-Mart. Mercedes Benz, Audi or BMW. 
To be successful 
means 
Access to technologies that will bring 
costs down. 
Cost and logistic efficiencies. 
R&D focus + Innovation. 
Ability to deliver high-quality 
products/services. 
To build an effective sales and 
marketing. 
 As it was shown in this section, to have a solid strategic view it is needed to 
understand the basic principles of Porter’s generic strategies, its benefits and how it 
should be selected. 
 A generic strategy influences present and future performance of a firm and 
impacts on the industrial sector in which competes.  
 To decide one of these generic strategies implies a specific set of skills and 
abilities to be developed, and a specific organization to be put in place.  
 A middle position involves harsh risks like low profitability, uncertainty and 
lack of clarity. There is not a company in the world which can stand them. 
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 4. THE SMART PROJECT 
 At the beginning, every project is a big interrogation mark and the Smart was 
not an exception. The initial ideas of Daimler Chrysler’s (DC)1F2 executives were not 
met on this project, and they collided with what experts of the industry said. Let’s 
review some of the positive and negative opinions that were found in our 
investigation. 
“Positive” opinions 
 There are not a lot of specialists who have positive opinions on the Smart, 
although there were found positive points of view but with some reservations. For 
instance, Keuning (2007) states that:  
• Smart is a kind of a revolution with a lot of skepticism around, and the 
breakeven may come in many years. It was launched in Oct., 1998 with an 
initial hope of 120,000 units to be sold in the first year but rapidly revised to 
80,000 units. In the half-year to June 2000, 54,000 cars were sold but the first 
estimate of 3 to 4 years of breakeven is history. 
• The initial argument to launch this project was that it would bring down the fuel 
consumption figures for Daimler helping the giant S-class to be on the road 
and not cannibalizing actual products.  
• Wealthy families would use two cars: an S-class for longer trips and a Smart 
to get into the city. As a consequence, two Daimler cars would be bought by 
the same family.  
• There were two inconveniences: 
1. The elk test for A-class retarded the development of the Smart, increasing 
costs further. 
2. Over-emphasis on fun: targeting young people and offering crazy colors. In 
addition, it was marketed like a toy, not being taken seriously. That is why it 
took more than a year to become acceptable for the streets of Munich and 
Berlin. 
                                                 
2 At the moment the Smart was launched (1998), Chrysler was part of Daimler-Benz. From 
2014 on, Chrysler is controlled by Fiat S. p. A. after their merger. The new holding is Fiat Chyster 
Automobiles (FCA) with headquarters in London. 
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 • This car is successful in cities like Rome (as Italians are used to small cars) 
and countries like Switzerland (for its link with Swatch Group, as Nicholas 
Hayek, its chairman, who in the early 1990s joined Daimler with the idea of 
bringing a watch manufacturer to the car industry). 
 
Negative opinions 
 Negative opinions are found not only from specialists but from the executives 
of DC. The article “Smart is a disaster – Mercedes boss” (2005) states that E. 
Cordes, the Head of the Mercedes Car Group, described that the Smart brand was a 
“disaster” but still has a future. Targets were not met and Cordes predicts that it 
would break even in 2007. Although Chief Executive J. Schrempp ruled it out to 
closure, he is convinced that “adds sympathy to the Group and helps to achieve 
voluntary emission targets”. 
 Additionally, Flint (2005) says that Smart had no sense from day one as they 
forgot what a car is about. He suggests that every auto company (like Toyota, 
Honda, BMW and Porsche) makes mistakes and that some cars make no sense. For 
instance: the 1997 GM’s electric car (two-seater with 40 to 80 miles of autonomy), 
the 2002 Ford Blackwood (a pick-up that couldn’t pick up anything and lacked four-
wheel drive). He insists that a car is valuable because of its versatility: carries a lot 
for huge distances in every condition, if not it doesn’t sell.  
 His personal view is that, as Smart is a partnership with Swatch watch 
(Switzerland) and Volkswagen rejected the project, it has different mistakes: 
• A car is not conceived to be parked in crowded cities, it is bought for mobility. 
Parking is not a reason for existence.  
• It is only for two people, and a couple cannot carry a baby or a friend. Lienert 
(2005) adds that smaller cars in America are not welcome as they are full of 
capacity and parking is easy, unless someone lives in New York or San 
Francisco. In addition, they are small for a medium American person and for 
American roads.   
• The fuel-stingy engine makes it slow not making it friendly-driven in any 
distance. The American traffic is not for this car.  
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 • The car body could be taken apart to match it with a dress, but nobody would 
do that in his/her right mind. 
• Smart needed to sell 200,000 units a year to breakeven but, at the most, they 
have not surpassed 100,000 a year.   
• In the first four years, the Smart lost $3 billion, which are compromising 
DaimlerChrysler results as, in accordance with Lienert (2005), needs 
resources to fix premium cars.  
• For the price of the Smart, Europeans could buy a more competent car like 
VW Polo with four seats and can go anywhere.   
 To add some more information to what Flint says on more competent cars 
found in different markets, it was made a price comparison in USA and Argentina on 
different models and brands which suggests that, in both countries, more 
comfortable/competent cars could be bought for what a Smart is priced. In addition, 
in USA the Smart is priced between $15,000 and $21,0002F3, and in Argentina prices 
varies from $22,300 to $26,4003F4.In addition, Davies (2013) says that he has a lot of 
fun zipping around Manhattan and Brooklyn but he will not buy one. He points out 
some positive points in its favor: it is targeted for people who are prone to new and 
interesting designs (ex.: Millenials, environmentalists, and city dwellers) and it is built 
for urban driving with great visibility. Parking and driving it is an excellent experience. 
However, also, he points out the negative: the automated manual transmission which 
offers a “jerky shifting of a poorly driven manual” and that being knocked by the wind 
it offers an unpleasant sensation. 
 Finally, Flint argues that quitting would be admitting a mistake, and executives 
hate to do that.  In addition, the plant was built in France as a symbol of German-
French cooperation, and dismissing French people would be politically 
embarrassing. DC leaders forgot that a car is much more than parking and cute as 
they must be able to do more things of what they are supposed to do.  
                                                 
3 From http://www.autoguide.com/new-cars/smart/, and 
http://www.thecarconnection.com/quickquotes/smart_fortwo_2016?wide, retrieved 11/23/2016. 
4 From http://autoblog.com.ar/2016/01/12/lanzamiento-smart-fortwo-y-forfour-2016/, retrieved 
11/23/2016. 
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The impacts of this project 
 Chronic losses, additional costs incurred and negative margins are the 
fundamental impacts of this project. In addition, some Institutions and specialists are 
recommending closing this project.  
 In addition, different specialists are against the way this project has been 
carried on and advert that what is being done is not enough, as follows:  
• The “Smart division has been a chronic loss maker since its birth in 1998 and 
promises of break-even have never been fulfilled”.  
 With 2004 financial results, DC disclosed a 500 million Euros loss in the year. 
Morgan Stanley investment bank estimates that each unit sold gives DC 4,000 
Euros loss and a 35% of negative margin.  
 In addition, the ForFour and the ForMore had been the source of many 
problems for the brand, and Smart is a huge problem DC has to deal with. 
Dismissing people is not enough, plants should be closed (WINTON, 2015).    
• Tran (2005) insists that DC would spend €1.2bn on Smart revamp after years 
of losses with this brand. The large costs of this project were impacting the 
firm’s earnings forecast for 2005 and obliged to recall 1.3 million Mercedes-
Benz vehicles worldwide. Significant earnings increase for 2007 (€600 
million), reductions in the workforce and to discontinue production of its 
roadster and SmartSUV were planned in order to restructure the Smart 
business model. Credit Suisse First Boston was skeptical on these moves as 
the announcement on Smart is not aggressive enough to deal with DC 
problems. 
 Moreover, Morgan Stanley bank advises that it is necessary to close this 
project. The article “Mercedes advised to close Smart” states that this bank 
urged DC to dump the £1.9bn cost incurred in closing Smart following BMW, 
whose share price went up after it jettisoned Rover in 2000. E. Cordes, 
Mercedes Benz boss, said that they “will present Smart anew”. 
 Because of this section, Smart was not conceived for what a car is about to 
be: versatility and friendly driven for long-distances. More competent cars are 
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 offered in the market and may be that is the reason why break even hasn’t 
come yet. In other words, it was followed a differentiation strategy and 
positioned in a higher target market for a car that is not price competitive for 
what it is. As huge losses and negative margins are the fundamental impacts 
seen, the peril of this project is that it may compromise Daimler as a whole.  
 
5. THE NEW BEETLE PROJECT 
 Sass (2013) and other publications4F5 say that the old Beetle was born in 
1930s. It is a record with +21 million produced and bestselling car of the 1950 
decade with 40% market share, remaining unchanged during 58 years and in 
production for 65 years (1938 to 2003).  
 Dhabhar (2016) remembers that the Beetle was created by Ferdinand 
Porsche during Hitler’s period with a subsidized plan (SASS, 2013), and was called 
the “People’s car”, helping a lot to motor the world.  
 McGinn (1998) suggests that it is not an easy job to create a modern version 
of a fable. After nineteen years that VW took the old Bug off the market in USA, it 
remained as the bestselling car in history and an icon for collectors. The author 
insists, “For a car designer, this was the equivalent of repainting the Mona Lisa”. Five 
years were needed to be designed, having 80% of its parts in common with VW´s 
Golf. It is stated that for elder people it can stir up emotions but after the design 
work, sales must happen.  
 Out of the study of different authors Dhabhar (2016), Sass (2013) and Lal 
(2005) it is possible to have an additional understanding on specific issues of both 
cars, the classic and the new Beetle: 
• In the 1950s, the Beetle was a success in India but in 2008 with an “exorbitant 
price tag”, it had few buyers. Its price is “absolutely ridiculous” and its price 
point is “absolutely far from the people’s car”. It is more a “fashion accessory” 
than a “mode of transport”. The original Beetle was inexpensive, but never 
cheap. 
                                                 
5 20 facts about the VW Beetle, from http://www.thefactsite.com/2016/07/volkswagen-beetle-
facts.html, retrieved 11/21/2016. 
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 • Its shape and low price rapidly attracted new generations of Americans. For 
many, it was their first car. A memorable advertising said it all: “Buy low. Sell 
high”. By 1970, the Beetle’s sales peaked at +400,000 units and it became an 
American icon.  
• In the period 1970-1993, the New Beetle sales declined from 500,000 units to 
50,000 in USA. However, in the period 1993-1997 sales rebounded to an 
annual 29% growth thanks to targeting a younger new generation.  
• The appreciation of the Deutsche mark against the dollar (1970s), the drop in 
oil prices (1982) and the declining popularity of hatchbacks contributed to the 
declining in its sales. In 1979, VW was impeded to comply with environmental 
legislation stopping selling cars in USA. Finally, and with a huge Japanese 
competition, in mid-1980s and for the first time since 1958, VW sales were dip 
below 100,000 units.  
• More than 10 years after the last Beetle was sold in USA, VW designers 
begun to design a New Beetle, based in four concepts: honest, simple, 
reliable, and original, with up-to-date German engineering and superior driving 
performance. By 1993, the concept car was finished and presented in the 
1994 Auto Show in Detroit. 
• The first step was the design process and the second one was directed to 
define the target market. In order to comply with this task, they begun to talk 
with potential customers, knowing that most of the old ones had personal 
histories, memories, and affection with the old Beetle, but the new ones had 
no emotional connection with the car.  As a result, it was thought for the small-
car segment, changing its positioning behind drivability. Its price range was 
$17,000-$18,000, more than the average price of competitors ($15,200). 
• It was very important to assess the right selling proposition. That is why it was 
needed to position The Beetle into the right segment and not as “a toy” but as 
a “real, drivable car”. 
• In 1994, VW prepared a relaunch in the USA market trying to modify the 
perception of poor quality and reliability of its products. In 1995 and 1996 and 
thanks to a new ad campaign, sales increased in each year 29% and by 1997, 
sales increased 178% in comparison to 1993 sales.  
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 • Jim Mateja (Chicago Tribune of 02/13/1994) said that VW must came up with 
a new, small and inexpensive car as the old Beetle, giving the opportunity to 
have what many people couldn’t. However, the New Beetle -made on the VW 
Golf platform- was larger, more spacious, had a better engine and nice shape, 
and offered front and side airbags.  
• Although the Classic Beetle has the outright charm to call the attention of any 
and every person, the New Beetle is prettier, larger and more comfortable, 
and incorporated the Porsche inspired spoiler. Both cars are solid and of good 
quality. 
 Both cars are shown in the following image: 
 
Figure 1: The Classic and the New Beetle 
Source: Dhabhar (2016) 
 
 Moreover, in the article “The whim’s duel: Mini Cooper versus New Beetle” 
(2012) it is compared esthetic, mechanic and comfort of both cars. It states that Mini 
Cooper wins in sportsmanship and the New Beetle in comfort, but both are treated 
as a whim. However, in this sense Mini Cooper wins. 
 Finally, it says that the New Beetle would end production in 2018 after 20 
years and two generations (this news is about to be confirmed), as traditional cars 
are not selling as utility-like vehicles are and VW needs to open production capacity. 
In addition, it has never good sales, and during the first quarter, 2016 VW delivered 
5,700 Beetles in USA, representing a 42% decline over previous year (GANZ, 2016).  
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 Price comparison 
 In USA, the New Beatle is priced in a range of $20,000-$26,000 and in 
Argentina it is approx. $ 28,000 for the hard top5F6. It is presented as “stylish, 
extravagant, and cool” and the Cabriolet version as “dynamic, sporty, and confident” 
with “an unusual denim-like finish”6F7. 
 It is fully equipped with features like six-speed automatic transmission, 2.5 liter 
five-cylinder and Electronic Stabilization Program (ESP), for safe driving under most 
conditions7F8. 
 The article “Apuntes del lanzamiento del Volkswagen The Beetle” (2014) says 
that in Argentina the sales expectations for 2014 were (only) 500 units.  In 2016, it 
was priced approx. $28,000/30,000 for a hard top8F9 (a VW Vento costs approx. 
26,000/31,0009F10) and in USA $20,000/26,00010F11. 
 Because of this paragraph, it is noted that in time, the New Beetle changed its 
positioning from an “inexpensive car”, to a “toy” and to a “real and drivable car”, but 
simplicity, smallness and inexpensiveness were not maintained as in the classic 
Bug.  
 In addition, it was infused with German engineering and superiority in many 
areas of the product, made on the Golf platform. As a result, the “people’s car” was 
not for everyone, changing the original generic strategy (leadership in cost) to a 
differentiation strategy.  
 In addition, the target market and the selling proposition were thought after its 
design was completed, not before.  Consequently, VW had not thought on what was 
needed in the market but on what they could produce.  
 Finally, prices are high in comparison to other cars offered in the market.  
 
 
 
                                                 
6 From http://autos.mercadolibre.com.ar/volkswagen/the-beetle/, retrieved 11/16/2016.   
7 From http://www.beetle.com/int/en/home, recovered 11/16/2016. 
8 From http://www.conduciendo.com/vw-new-beetle-final-edition-2209, retrieved 11/16/2016. 
9 From http://autos.mercadolibre.com.ar/volkswagen/the-beetle/, retrieved 11/23/2016. 
10 From http://volkswagen.carone.com.ar/vento/?gclid=CPTn7NiNqNACFQIJkQod644FaA, 
retrieved 11/23/2016. 
11 From http://www.vw.com/models/beetle/section/safety/, retrieved 11/23/2016. 
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 6. CONCLUSIONS 
 Sustainable growth comes from a proper fit between strategy (a sufficient 
condition) and Operational Effectiveness (OE, a necessary condition, but not 
sufficient). While strategies is a path to sustainable profitability, selecting a different 
set of activities or do them in a different way, OE is about inputs and outputs and in 
doing better than competitors. In this sense, inclusive development should be seen 
as a big opportunity for growth. 
 Leadership is about strategy and management is about OE. That is why, 
leaders must focus on the present and future of their industries, selecting the right 
one to compete, an adequate set of activities and the next practices needed to go 
forward.  
 To be open and flexible is an imperative for sustainable growth. That is why 
leaders characteristics relate to nonconformity, look for uncharted territories, 
development through learning, helping others, inclusion, transparency, and loyalty.  
 To have a solid strategic perspective implies the understanding of the basic 
principles of Porter’s generic strategies, its benefits and how it should be selected. 
As a result, it is important to understand generic strategies, as follows:  
• Cost leadership implies cost reductions (no frills), efficiencies and ROI. There 
are needed differentiation sacrifices, if apply.  
As price is in competitive parity, the profit per product is low and the market 
share should be high.  
Its key concepts are: scale, cost reduction/minimization, integration, quick 
learning and control.  
Key company emphasis should be on efficiency and effectiveness.  
• Differentiation relates to building a perceived uniqueness and attractiveness 
on products/services, and higher quality.  
As premium prices should be established, the profit per product is high and 
the market share is low.  
Its key concepts are: uniqueness, brand loyalty, less price sensibility and 
exclusivity.  
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 Key company emphasis should be on R&D and innovation. 
• A middle position among one of these generic strategies involves harsh risks 
like low profitability, uncertainty and lack of clarity.  
• Each generic strategy needs to develop a different set of organizational skills 
and a specific organization to be put in place, influencing the industrial sector 
in which the firm competes.    
 Taking into consideration what it was said before, the Smart and the New 
Beetle could be considered avoidable strategic mistakes, as per the following 
reasons: 
• The Smart was not conceived for what it is expected from a car: versatility and 
friendly driven for long-distances; other better offers are found in the market. 
For the segment in which it competes, high differentiation and huge price 
premiums are not recognized because of customers’ price sensibility.  
 Moreover, it is possible that the Mercedes Benz’s customer would not like to 
 pay what is supposed for one of its products having the Smart (a cheaper 
 product) as part of  Mercedes’ product line, giving an additional argument for 
 which the Smart may compromise Daimler as a whole.     
• The New Beetle (more seen as a toy than as a drivable car) changed the 
positioning of the old Beetle (simplicity, smallness and inexpensiveness), and 
its original generic strategy (from leadership in costs to differentiation). Being 
priced very high for what the classic Beetle was, it seems a car “not-for-
everyone” and not a “people’s car”.  
 For what it was said before, it is not said that a generic strategy is impossible 
 to be  changed. The fact is that pretending to sell a product just because it 
 was an icon and not considering the minimum strategic basis may be a  fault. 
 New generations “forget” history  and look for actual results.   
  In addition, as the target market and the selling proposition were thought  after 
 completing the product design, VW seemed doing as in Ford’s times: selling 
 what is produced and not thinking on customer’s desire or on what he/she 
 could be delighted. To replicate icon products is not a synonym of  excellent 
 future sales and breakeven point achievement.   
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 Professor Porter while talking about strategy and generic strategies warns 
hazards and risks.  The Smart and the New Beetle show the risks of higher 
differentiation that is not being paid by the customer, no matter how if it is about 
recognized brands or icon products. Losses and negative margins are applicable to 
every firm.   
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